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A Theory of Evaluating Drama and Theatre 
William J. Free* 
During the past two decades, the theory of dramatic structure and the 
vocabulary for describing both the playscript and its performance have 
expanded enormously.1 Unfortunately, understanding the evaluative judg-
ment of playscript and performance has not kept pace. In fact, the seventies 
witnessed a growing hostility to the idea of judgment, especially if applied to 
the performer. To one theatre scholar, this hostility is a product of an 
emphasis on process rather than product in educational and by extension 
professional theatre (Motter 5-7). But an equally plausible and perhaps more 
basic cause is a lack of understanding of what aesthetic judgment involves, 
especially when applied to the total dramatic/theatrical experience. 
Particularly, critics who write from the viewpoint of performance theory 
and those who write from literary aesthetics appear to have found little or no 
common ground. Many performance-oriented critics either ignore evaluative 
processes altogether, or, like J . L. Styan, center the evaluative process in only 
one aspect of the total theatre experience. 
Styan insists that value judgment in drama must be centered on individual 
plays in interaction with individual audiences. In contending that " a play-
goer's satisfaction will reflect the kind and quality of the imaginative life he is 
living',' and that "if the play illuminates any side of his life which was dim 
before . . . then he can say that there is quality in the interest stimulated" 
(1963, 269), Styan describes a valid and important aspect of theatre judgment, 
but only one limited and subjective aspect. Furthermore, he centers his 
attention on the flow of sensations between audience and performer without 
attempting to describe a systematic field of judgment structuring those 
sensations. 
On the other hand, phenomenological critics like Roman Ingarden 
recognize the hierarchal complexities of literary experience but do not extend 
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that recognition to the added complexity of performance. To Ingarden the 
cognition of the literary text is largely a matter of internal consciousness rather 
than external perception (414-16). Although he does recognize that different 
modes of value perception are at work on different modes of literary cognition, 
and that criticism must somehow take account of those different levels, his 
insistence on consistency and his weakness in dealing with external perfor-
mance fail to extend our understanding of evaluating the playscript or 
performance either separately or in unity. 
A second problem involves verifying value judgments. To some theorists, 
Ingarden among them, judgment implies the existence of rules and meta-rules 
by which critics can verify the accuracy of their predications of value. To 
them, when a critic says "This is a good play," he should be able to support 
his contention by reference to relevant and (nearly) universally accepted rules 
and be able to validate the relevance of his rules by reference to meta-rules on 
a higher level of abstraction. 
We can find a clear example of this process in Rolf Fjelde's assignment of 
Ibsen's work to the status of "masterpiece." Fjelde insists that " a bonafide 
masterpiece ought to display . . . range, depth, and urgency, in varying, but 
collectively sufficient degrees," (584) and goes on to argue that Ibsen's plays 
satisfy those criteria. He seems to take the criteria, however, to be self-evident, 
validated by the history of their use. Further, these values seem to be capable 
of automatic transference into any potential performance of an Ibsen play. 
Most directors of Ibsen would probably find this a highly problematic concept. 
Such judgment seems to lie outside the everyday experience of creating a 
performance. 
Others consider judgmental statements in the arts as versions of what 
Joseph Margolis calls "appreciat ions" (223-25). To them value predications 
are validated not by logic but by persuasion; they are not absolute, they are 
plausible. The critic can persuade us of the plausbility of his appreciation of a 
play by connecting his judgment convincingly to the reality of the perfor-
mance or playscript under consideration. If his description is an inadequate 
accounting of our experience with the play or if it is irrelevant (such as John 
Simon's statement in a review of A Midsummer Night's Dream that black actors 
must never be cast in some roles, which is irrelevant because it does assume a 
universally applicable rule) his statements carry no force. Styan's insistence 
on the playgoer's satisfaction as the grounding of theatre value is just such an 
appreciation, for it states that the play derives its value from its making life 
more plausible to the playgoer, an argument much more forceful than a rules-
based judgment. 
The above is a brief and selective sampling of what is a complex and 
extensive problem. But from it we can derive several premises guiding any 
comprehensive theory of evaluating theatre art. 
First, we must recognize that our experience of playscript and perfor-
mance, alone or jointly, occurs on several discrete levels of consciousness, each 
of which functions in unity with the other. 
Secondly, a single vocabulary cannot be relevant on all levels. The same 
vocabulary relevant to the structure of a playscript will not function to 
describe the actor's, director's, and designer's contribution to the perfor-
mance. 
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Thirdly, our present appreciation of a performance during the act of 
witnessing and our later continuing the evaluation through memory must be 
dealt with on different terms and on the different structural and semiotic levels 
involved. 
Fourthly, we must recognize that some evaluations are intentional acts of 
consciousness and some are automatic responses grounded in our immediate 
involvement with what we are watching or reading. A single vocabulary 
cannot describe and validate judgments made both intentionally and uninten-
tionally. 
II 
The remainder of this paper offers not a solution to these problems but a 
heuristic model that attempts to separate four levels of appreciation and the 
acts of judgment relevant to each. The structure of the model derives from the 
German phenomenologist Max Scheler. In his Formalism in Ethics and Non-
Formal Ethics of Values Scheler postulates a four-part stratification of our 
emotional life, each with its own mode of value. His four strata are not 
necessarily equivalent to the levels of response to theatre, but the two parallel 
in stimulating ways. By exploring these parallels we can perhaps move in the 
direction of a comprehensive theory of evaluating drama and theatre. 
Scheler designates his four levels as (1) sensory feeling, (2) vital feeling, (3) 
psychic feeling, and (4) spiritual feeling. Each stratum has its individual 
definition and can stand independent of the others, yet the strata interact 
within the unified experience of the person. Similarly, we respond to the 
theatre on different levels of our emotional and psychological beings and at 
different times. Scheler's four levels can help us clearly separate these 
responses. 
In borrowing Scheler's categories I am not committing my remarks to the 
phenomenological method. Rather I am attempting to describe a connection 
between the flow of sensations from the performance text or of verbal codes 
from the dramatic text and the various acts of judgment within the viewer/ 
reader. I am further trying to suggest the degree to which these four levels of 
judgment can be discrete on the one hand and united on the other. 
i. 'SENSORY FEELING 
Scheler's definition of sensory feeling contains two terms that are particu-
larly relevant to the theatre experience. Sensory feeling is never without an 
object, and it is exclusively a phenomenon of the present moment. 
By the first of these, Scheler means that sensory experience cannot be 
intentionally created by an act of imagination but must be actually present to 
the senses. Although hallucinations resembling sensory experience can be 
stimulated (by drugs, for example), they differ from sensory experience in two 
ways. First, they are not true sensory experiences but only semblances. 
Second, although taking the drug is an intentional act, the drug taker cannot 
control the nature of his hallucinations. By the second term, Scheler means 
that sensory experience cannot be derived from memory, nor does it have 
reference to anything before of after the immediate experience. It occurs in 
only one temporal dimension, which is now. 
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Sensory feeling accompanies our immediate perception of dramatic 
performance. The flow of visual and aural stimuli from the stage is present to 
our senses and cannot be duplicated at another time. It is either pleasant or 
unpleasant, value qualities Scheler attributes to the senses. 
This experience cannot be duplicated by reading a playscript because the 
immediate sensory content of literature is minimal. The words of the 
playscript are present to the reader only through an intentional act of his 
imagination, which occurs on a level of experience other than the sensory and 
which more nearly resembles controlled hallucination than true sensory 
experience. This fact forms the basic distinction between the script as 
literature and as performed theatre.2 
Our evaluation of performance on the sensory level is automatic and 
unintentional. We can willfully refuse to perceive the sight and sound from the 
stage; we can look around and daydream, talk to our companion, or even 
leave the theatre. But if we act in good faith, we become receptors of the 
sensory stimuli before us. In this case, if our attention wanders because the 
experience is not pleasant, we have made an automatic and unintentional 
value judgment. To put it another way, we have intended to be pleased, but 
the stimuli from the stage have countered our intention. This judgment is 
subject to no rules or conditions other than our presence in the theatre. It is 
the basis of our subsequent judgments even though we cannot articulate it 
except as a wandering of the attention or by whispering to our neighbor, 
"This is dul l . " 
If we say "Th i s is dul l" after the fact of witnessing the performance we 
have moved to a different, past tense, level of experience. We cannot return to 
the original sensory experience for verifications since every new performance 
is a new stimulus both to the actor and the audience. Additionally, a sensory 
judgment is unarguable. Telling someone who was bored that he should not 
have been is pointless since no principles exist on which to base such an 
argument except the moment of his boredom. Nor does his boredom predicate 
boredom for anyone else. We may argue with his judgments on all other 
levels, but not on the level of sensory feeling. 
2. VITAL FEELING 
Vital feeling Scheler defines as the unitary feeling of life in which the 
various sensory feelings are given wholeness and extension. As such it is the 
vaguest of his concepts and the most difficult to express adequately. 
Theatre critics and artists instinctively know when a performance is 
"a l ive" or " d e a d " but lack a fully adequate critical vocabulary for describing 
those conditions. Such words as energy, rhythm, and Stanislavski's communion try 
to articulate the performer's bringing into unity and life the separate sensory 
moments of the play, but a certain mysticism still surrounds such terms. 
Performing artists deal with practical techniques for producing vital feeling, 
but by and large have been less interested in articulating theories about them. 
Literary critics ignore them altogether. 
Audiences sense that vitality comes from the skill of the performer. But this 
realization raises as many problems as it solves. Bernard Beckerman, for 
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example, distinguishes between the transparent performance, where the 
spectator sees through the actor's skill to the reality beneath, and opaque 
performance, where the spectator's pleasure comes to a large extent from 
perceiving that skill (31-32). But neither of these explanations accounts for the 
vitality of the performance. Beckerman here distiguishes between naturalistic 
and "al ienated" theatre, but does not account for the fact that either of these 
can be " d e a d " or "a l ive" to the audience. 
Futhermore, the actor's skill cannot be reduced to the technical accuracy 
with which he articulates language and movement. We have all witnessed 
performances that were technically accurate but lifeless. Most directors would 
probably agree that the chronological progress of rehearsing a play moves 
from chaos to technical competency to vitality. And anyone who has been 
involved in theatre knows that vitality is fragile: it is here tonight, gone 
tomorrow. The problem is not its existence but the inadequacy of our 
vocabulary to describe its experience. 
If we cannot satisfactorily define vitality, we can at least locate it as a 
separate stratum of theatre experience. The differences between performance 
and literature are again relevant here. Vitality in the play script is present as a 
potentiality rather than an actuality. The reader can discover the potentials for 
theatrical rhythm within the script, but he cannot actualize these potentials in 
sensory experience. Only the artists—actors, directors, designers, lighting 
and sound technicians—can actualize (or fail to actualize) the potential vitality 
of the script. The reader of the script can judge its vitality only hypothetically 
and should be aware of the fact that his/her judgment is problematic. Failure 
to be aware of this limitation accounts for such statements as Hazlett 's that 
Shakespeare cannot be adequately performed. 
Although the vitality of the play is not identical to its sensory level, it is 
dependent on sensory response to the extent that a performance which loses 
our attention cannot have vitality for us no matter how much potential is in its 
script. Potential vitality must be realized in performance in order to exist for 
us. The skill of the performer unifies potential vitality and sensory pleasure, 
energy and form, the sense of life and the fictions of the stage. 
When describing the intentionality of the judgment of vital feeling we 
enter a gray zone. We perceive the vitality of a play automatically as we 
perceive its sensory value, but our articulation of that value is an intentional 
act which occurs after the conclusion of the experience. If we attempt to 
articulate the rhythm or energy of a performance during our experience of it, 
we lose a degree of attention, which is self-defeating. A description of a play's 
vitality involves an intentional act of reference to the sensory experience of the 
performance, and this is possible only after the fact. Such a description is an 
appreciation in the sense defined above. It operates somewhere between the 
boundaries of sensory impression and form, between life and fiction. 
3. PSYCHIC FEELING 
Psychic feeling involves the perception of meaningful forms in the flow of 
vital sensations. It is intellectual, intentional, and after-the-fact of experience. 
Psychic judgment occurs in reference to our perceiving the design of the work: 
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that is, to the organization of its semiotic materials irrespective of the vitality, 
real or potential, which it may or may not have as performance. 
The point of reference for this judgment is the total sense accumulated in 
our culture of the way dramatic works are structured. This sense is contained 
in the history of dramatic theory and practice available to us. None of these 
concepts provides rules which dictate the presence or absence of value, but all 
are culturally available to us as interpretive vocabularies by which the critic 
can justify his predication of value to the design of the work. The critic's 
choice of vocabulary on this level implies an interpretation of the work, just as 
the director's and actor's artistic choices imply an interpretation of design 
which guides the movement of their performance. 
If we assume that the predication of aesthetic value to artworks implies the 
presence of a coherent design, several conclusions follow. 
First, verifying the presence of a design in a particular play involves an 
intentional act of describing the play in reference to design features described-
in the history of dramatic theory and in theatre history. We may experience 
design features below the treshold of consciousness, but we can describe them 
only intentionally by raising them from what Freud calls "preconsciouness" 
into consciousness. 
Second, the verification of the predication of value depends on the critic's 
or director's ability to persuade (one in the language of criticism, the other in 
the semiotics of performance) his reader/audience of the coherence of this 
interpretation of the design. 
Therefore, third, there are as many potential interpretations of the design 
of a given play as critics/directors can satisfactorily verify as plausible. If we 
assume that our total experience with the formal design of plays is a part of our 
preconscious knowledge (or to shift from Freud to Kant, part of the schema by 
which our imaginations order the sensory experience which we are receiving 
from the stage or the page), the number of formal designs we can perceive is 
limited only by the number of possibilities contained in that body of 
preconscious material. 
Four, it is valid, consequently, to think of criticism and performance as 
creatively open-ended without abandoning the concept of aesthetic judgment. 
Playwrights and other theatre artists may discover new modes of design which 
they articulate through their medium and which criticism subsequently 
describes in its vocabulary. As dramatic criticism and practice respond to the 
flow of human history, new possibilities arise for literary and theatre critics 
and for theatre artists in their quest for more satisfying concepts of design in 
plays. The twentieth century has witnessed an enormous expansion of these 
possiblities, for example, through the theoretical and practical work of people 
like Artaud and Brecht. 
4. SPIRITUAL FEELING 
The idea of spiritual values moves the play into engagement with the world 
at large. Like psychic values, spiritual values imply intentional interpretation 
of the the play verified by relation to idea and structures outside the play and 
its immediate performance. Perhaps I can clarify this point by two references. 
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The difference between interpretation of design and the attributing of 
spiritual value resembles Tzvetan Todorov's distinction between "commen-
tary," "which sticks close to a given text [or performance] and elucidates its 
individual elements," and "interpretat ion," "which attempts an integrated 
reading of a given work by translating the set [of individual elements] into 
another set of terms . . . " (10). This act of translation refers to what Eugenio 
Montale calls the "second life" of an artwork (20-24). This second life, which 
Montale describes as "its entire flowing back into the very life from which art 
itself took first nourishment" (22), refers to the total absorption of work of art 
into the life of an individual or a culture where it serves as a point of reference 
for organizing and enriching life, a process very like that cited from Styan at 
the beginning of this paper. 
Psychic and spiritual values seem ambiguous to some degree, but on close 
examination we can see that the ambiguity is more apparent than real. 
Psychic values lie inside, spiritual values outside, the accumulated cultural 
history of the art of theatre. The director or actor may interpret the design of a 
play from the standpoint of spiritual values, such as Olivier's playing Hamlet 
as having an Oedipus complex. But in doing so, he is appropriating from 
Freudian psychology designs which are not inherent to drama per se and 
layering them over (or integrating them within) the structural/functional 
implications of Shakespeare's play script. To a large extent the nature of 
"concept productions" is that the artist finds (or forces) spiritual values on the 
design of the play in order to extend or even force its second life.3 Such a 
method differs sharply from using the culturally accumulated theory of 
dramatic design to understand the designs and rhythms inherent in the text. 
Ascribing psychic and spiritual values to a play are both interpretative acts, 
but they approach the play from different directions. 
The distinction of four levels of dramatic/theatrical experience explains 
why a farce or melodrama may satisfy our attention, may be judged vital in 
performance and of adequate design, but may not enter the life of our culture 
as do King Lear, Phaedra, or The Cherry Orchard. The farce and melodrama may 
even be revived and continue to satisfy us by their vitality, but they do not 
linger in the long-term memory of our culture. They have no true second life. 
These distinctions also help account for the lack of understanding between 
theatre and literary critics. Literary critics tend to place higher value on 
spiritual values and theatre critics on vitality and design. If both groups 
acknowledge that value exists on several levels in a given play, many critical 
disagreements could be shown to be not about a play itself but about the 
priority of values. 
I l l 
Although Scheler's stratification model does not provide an answer to the 
question of evaluating theatre art, it does pinpoint several areas where greater 
understanding and more adequate critical vocabulary are needed. It also 
suggests a number of premises for dealing with them. To illustrate, I will 
conclude by sketching three. 
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Premise 1. Value in drama is cumulative as we move through the strata of 
evaluation. The more value ascribable to a play on the more levels, the greater 
its ultimate value. We have all experienced performances which hold our 
attention, have a high degree of vitality, but which are poorly designed and/or 
have little or no second life. Such are especially common in a mass medium 
like television. To say that a performance of this sort is valueless is a 
contradiction of fact. To praise it excessively is absurd. 
Premise 2. Fidelity to the values of the written playscript (although not 
necessarily slavish adherence to its literal fact) is a necessary part of the value 
of the total theatre art. Part of the value of a given performance of a dramatic 
text comes from the relationship of sensory and vital values, both of which 
exist in performance, and psychic and spiritual values which exist both inside 
and outside performance. They exist in reading the playscript as well as in 
witnessing its performance. Performing the script unifies and synthesizes these 
various levels of value. Imbalance on either side weakens the potential value of. 
the performance to the audience. A performance can be made so lively that 
the design and significance of the script are lost; a script can be so slavishly 
recreated that it is lifeless. Both acts obviously weaken the potential value of 
the experience. 
Suppose two performances of A Midsummer Night's Dream, productions A 
and B. Both satisfy the demand for vitality and attention. But on reflection we 
decide that A reduces the potentials of the text's design and "second life" to 
something relatively more trivial than does B. We can therefore judge 
production B artistically superior, although we cannot judge A as being 
without merit. Both reviewers and academic critics should be more aware of 
this distinction, for it can serve to eliminate much of the misunderstanding 
and hostility dividing artists and critics. 
Premise 3. Judgment cannot be suspended at any point in the total theatre 
experience, but different kinds of judgment function at different points in the 
experience. 
Richard Hornby insists that the artist must occasionally suspend judgment 
and consider the script on which he works as potentially perfect. "Only then ," 
he contends, "will he be likely to find any dynamic structures beneath the 
surface, because structures must take into account the entire script rather than 
just those parts one finds immediately attractive" (36). What I think Hornby 
means is that the artist must suspend spiritual judgment. We must assume 
that any performer wants to give the most vital and pleasing performance 
possible. From that viewpoint, any script, or even no script, is potentially 
perfect, since all are capable of generating high value on the sensory and vital 
levels. The pre-rehearsal determination of the performance implications of 
any playscript as well as the process of trial and error which accompanies any 
good preparation of a performance while in rehearsal is constantly a process of 
selecting the better over the weaker potentials on these value levels. The 
audience's and the critic's evaluations of the production, if informed and 
accurate, should describe the values discovered in the total dramatic experi-
ence ranging from the playwright's study to the rehearsal hall to the moment 
of performance. Such clear-headed understanding of the methods and 
importance of evaluation on all levels might help stop artist and critic from 
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being adversaries and restore critical evaluation to its true place in the total 
theatre experience. 
University of Georgia 
Notes 
1. The most prominent works in this development are: Jackson G. Barry, Dramatic Structure 
(Berkeley: U of California P, 1970); Bernard Beckerman, Dynamics of Drama (New York: Knopf, 
1970); Roger Gross, Understanding Playscripts (Bowling Green, O H : Bowling Green UP, 1974); 
Richard Hornby, Script Into Performance (Austin: U of Texas P, 1977); J . L. Styan, The Elements of 
Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1963); and Drama, Stage, and Audience (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge UP, 1975). My debt to all these works is extensive. 
2. Kant distinguishes clearly between the external imagery available to the senses through 
performance in arts such as music, dance, and acting and the internal imagery which the 
subjective imagination must supply through the mediation of signs and symbols. See Critique of 
Judgment, trans. J . H . Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1966) 61 . Ingarden departs from Kant in 
seeming to think that reading a play occurs in the same form of present tense as seeing a 
performance. See Cognition 136-37. But performance is materially different from reading in that 
both direct stimulation to the senses and the mediated imagery of language are simultaneously 
present. Furthermore, the reader can repeat his reading; the audience cannot repeat its 
witnessing. (This is not to say that any two readings are identical any more than any two 
witnessings.) As reader-response critics such as Stanley Fish point out, second readings occur in 
the context of a different set of expectations from first readings. But this difference lodges solely in 
the reader; the text remains the same. In performance both the text and the audience's horizons of 
expectation shift—greatly from production to production (say a minimalist warehouse production 
of Hamlet as opposed to the Royal Shakespeare Company ' s mainstage production) and subtly 
from performance to performance of the same production. What director hasn' t been startled to 
hear lines he's never heard before or mumbled to himself, " W h a t ' s he doing over t he re?" The 
reader's dramatic text remains the same; the performance text is constantly shifting. 
3. David Cole, The Theatrical Event (Middletown, C T : Wesleyan UP, 1975) 152-53, attacks 
concept productions for depriving the audience of an open experience of the play by forcing an 
interpretive pattern on the play which interferes with the audience's reaction to the " s t rangeness" 
of the play. My contention here is that concept productions are acceptable if they can be 
persuasively justified from the play. 
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